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Against the  background of the recent rate of expansion of China’s higher education 
system that has outstripped even China’s own high rate of economic growth, the paper 
examines evidence of the emerging problem of graduate overeducation within China. 
Based upon a pecking-order model of employment offers and associated ordered probit 
model, it analyses the empirical factors which determine the incidence of graduate 
overeducation across China. The extent to which individual students have an incentive to 
become overeducated compared to a socially optimal level of their education is also 
examined in the context of a supporting economic model that compares individual and 
socially optimal levels of investment in education, in the face of labour market demands. 
The extent of the divergence between individual and socially optimal levels of 
investment in education, and of the associated levels of graduate overeducation, is found 
to depend upon how recent major increases in the supply of graduates within China will 
interact with the future growth rates in job specifications, in demand variables and in 
resultant graduate wages within China.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
In this paper, we present evidence of an emerging problem of overeducation in China’s graduate 
population, and of the factors which determine the incidence of overeducation. The importance of 
China as a major player in world markets, and a dominant emergent economy of the twenty-first 
century, is now widely acknowledged. However, while China has indeed experienced an 
impressive rate of economic growth, this has been outstripped in several recent years by the 
expansion rate of its higher education system, as we illustrate in Table 1 below. Given the 
magnitude of China’s current production of graduates, of some 3.1 million per annum in 2005, the 
extent of its current overeducation problem is clearly important from the viewpoint of the 
economics of the graduate labour market within China itself.  
Table 1: The growth rates of higher education and GDP in China 
Year Total  Number 
    of  Under- 
    Graduates 
   (thousands) 
  Total Number  
      of  Post- 
    Graduates 
   (thousands) 
New entrants 
    of Under- 
  Graduates 
  (thousands) 
New entrants 
     of Post- 
  Graduates 
 (thousands) 
 Growth Rate 
    of Total 
New Entrants 
   (per cent) 
Growth Rate  
   of  GDP in  
constant prices 
    (per cent) 
1990          1970            93          579           30        -8.8*          -8.9 
1995          1956          145          875           51        11.5*          14.4 
1996          2858          163          907           59          4.3           7.2 
1997          2998          176        1064           64          3.5           6.7 
1998          3211          199        1011           73          8.4           6.1 
1999          3901          234        1505           92        47.3            6.2 
2000          5260          301        2078         128        38.1           8.6 
2001          6797          393        2518         165        21.6           8.0 
2002          8533          501        3002         203        19.5           9.0 
2003        10435          651        3553         269        19.3         10.2   
2004        13335          820        4473         326        16.7         12.4 
2005        15618          979        5044         365        12.7         14.5 
2006        17388        1105        5460         398          8.3         14.7 
Sources: Ministry of Education and Ministry of Labor and Social Security, China  (1998-2006) 
* average growth rate over 5 years. 
 
With the increasingly international nature of the higher education market for students, the 
magnitude of China’s overeducation problem may also, however, have important consequences for 
the economics of the higher education systems of other major economies. Table 2 shows the 
growth in recent years in the numbers of students from China studying abroad. Whilst this has 
been substantial in the US, it has been even greater in percentage terms in the UK, Canada and 
Australia. Since students from China typically pay overseas tuition fees which are several times 
higher than those paid by UK (and EU) students, they have also become an important source of 
income for UK universities, where in 2005-6 they accounted for 16.8 per cent of all overseas   2
students, compared to 11.1 per cent of overseas students studying at higher education institutions 
in the US. 
Table 2: The number of students from China studying abroad 
        Year         US      Canada      Australia           UK 
     1998-99       51001        1791         3220          4445 
   1999-2000       54466        3837         4291          7160 
    2000-01       59939        6055         5679        12095 
    2001-02       63211      13435         9079        20710 
    2002-03       64757      11159       22154        35160 
    2003-04       61765       9822       30086        47735 
    2004-05       62523      10032       30203        52675 
    2005-06       62582       N/A       37441        55504 
Sources: US National Centre for Education Statistics, and Institute of International Education, Statistics 
Canada, Australian Department of Education, Science and Training, UK Higher Education Statistics 
Agency. 
 
As a labour-intensive service industry with a growing export component, higher education within 
the UK and other developed economies offers many attractions as a target for expansion and a 
means of economic adjustment to the decline in their manufacturing sectors in recent decades. The 
rise of China’s own economy and the liberalisation of international trade are themselves indeed 
helping to accelerate the decline in their manufacturing sectors. Overeducation amongst China’s 
own graduate population, however, poses a potential threat to the level of international student 
demand from China, if students from China risk being unable to recoup their associated investment 
in human capital through securing graduate-level employment on their return to China.  
 
 
2.  Pecking Order Analysis 
 
In view of the substantial changes which are occurring in both the higher education sector and the 
wider economy and employment market in China, we need a framework of analysis that can take 
on board changes in the rate of graduate overeducation in response to changes in the demand for, 
and supply of, graduates over time. Human capital theory, as developed by Becker (1993) and 
Mincer (1974), however, concentrates on the supply side of the labour market, with wages 
determined by the assumption that a constant rate of return on investment in years of education 
will be earned with certainty. We therefore examine an alternative pecking order theory for the 
incidence of overeducation. The pecking order theory we analyse below specifically addresses the 
assignment problem discussed by Sattinger (1993) and enables considerations of the determinants 
of the demand for different levels of labour skills to be incorporated within the analysis.    
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Within this framework, the demand for graduates is a derived demand. It is derived from the 
demand by employers for individuals whose skills and other characteristics can complement the 
specifications of the jobs they are seeking to fill. Each job  t j Ω ∈  within the set  t Ω of all available 
jobs at time t is assumed to have a list of job specifications at time t given by the vector 
Zjt=(Zj1t,....,Zjmt), which specifies the work which the job entails. How well that job is carried out 
depends upon the skills and other characteristics of the individual who occupies the post associated 
with the job. Each individual i is assumed to possess a vector of  characteristics Xit=(Xi1t,....,Xint) at 
time t that includes n-1 objective characteristics, such as their educational qualifications or 
functions of them, as its first n - 1 elements. Its last element is a stochastic term Xint ≡ uit that 
reflects other less objective characteristics of the individual, such as their enthusiasm, which the 
employer can assess by less formal means, such as interviews, and which also contribute to the 
individual’s ability to make an enhanced contribution.   
 
The value of the output from the job will depend also upon the demand in the product market for 
the output of goods or services which the job produces. The main drivers of the level of demand at 
time t for such output across all jobs for whom graduates may be candidates include economy-
wide factors Yt=(Yt1,....,Yts), such as the country’s level of GDP, its growth rate, its foreign 
exchange rates with its major trading partners, and its rate of population growth. 
 
More specifically, we will assume that if individual i occupies job j at time t the value of their 
output is given by the Cobb-Douglas function: 
 













= ∏ ∏∏                                                                           (2.1) 
 
where the  τ α , ah and bk are positive constants, with an=1, and the Tt and (j  are positive stochastic 
terms that vary across each t and j respectively according to independent standardised lognormal 
distributions. In addition, we will assume that each employer faces a wage function of the form: 
 
                          ( ,...., ) it it i1t int ww X X =                                                                                         (2.2) 
 
that specifies the wage that must be paid at time t to recruit individual i with characteristics 
Xit=(Xi1t,....,Xint). The employer for job j is assumed to select the individual i who will occupy the 
post according to the individual’s characteristics Xit in order to maximise the net value Vijt - wit to   4
the employer of having such an individual perform job j. Since for each  t j Ω ∈ , the individual 
characteristics Xiht influence Vijt in (2.1) via the index 
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employers will evaluate each individual according to their overall value of Cit, and are willing to 
offer a higher wage to individuals whose overall value of Cit is greater. For each small increase in 
Cit , the employer for job j  would be willing to pay an additional wage premium up to an amount 
equal to  / ijt it VC ∂∂ . In a competitive labour market, the wage wit will be bid up to be an increasing 
function of Cit , with 
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for the job j which individual i performs. Moreover, since 
2 (/ ) 0 ijt it jt VC J ∂∂ ∂ > employers with 
jobs whose specification level is higher according to the index Jjt will be willing to offer a greater 
additional premium to individuals who possess superior characteristics according to the index Cit 
than employers with jobs whose specification level is lower according to the index Jjt . In a 
competitive labour market, employers with jobs whose specification level is higher according to 
the index Jjt  will succeed in recruiting individuals with superior characteristics according to the 
index Cit .  The top z individuals according to the index of individual characteristics Cit are then 
recruited to the top z jobs according to the index Jjt of job specifications for all 0< z #ηt , where  ηt 
is the total number of jobs in the economy at time t. We will assume for simplicity that the total 
number of jobs, including those in subsistence agriculture, at each time t is equal to the number of 
individuals of working age, with all individuals assumed to have access to at least a subsistence 
job. We then have 
 
                   
1 () (() ) 0 () () t it t jt it it jt it t t it C J C for all C and hence J C C φϕ ϕ φ
− => =                         (2.5) 
 
where  Jjt(Cit) is the level of specification for the job to which an individual with a level of 
characteristics Cit is recruited, Nt  is the distribution function at time t for Cit across the population 
of individuals of working age, and nt is the distribution function at time t for Jjt across jobs in the 
economy. We will assume that Nt and nt are both cumulative lognormal distribution functions, so 
that (2.5) implies:   5
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σσ θθ σσ =≡ −                                               (2.6) 
 
where 2Jt and 2Ct are the mean values of ln Jjt  and ln Cit , and FJt and FCt are their respective 
standard deviations, at time t.  
 
(2.3), (2.4) and (2.6) imply a wage function of the form: 
 
             
1
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where  . is a constant of integration, which equals zero if the reservation wage given by the 
employment benefit rate is zero and jobs in agriculture offering a subsistence wage are available to 
all (see Sattinger, 1993). With unemployment benefits in China less than one per cent of the wage 
level of many new graduates, we will assume that these conditions hold, and hence set . = 0. 
Equations (2.1), (2.3), (2.4), (2.6) and (2.7) then imply: 
 
                &/ ( ) 0 0
tt
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ϖϖ σσ σ =− = + > >                           (2.8) 
 
so that wage levels still enable employers to make a net surplus from the jobs they offer. 
 
In a pecking order model, individual characteristics Xit=(Xi1t,....,Xint) play an important part in 
wage determination, as in equation (2.7). However, so too do the parameters, 2Jt and FJt , of the 
distribution of job characteristics, alongside the parameters, 2Ct and FCt , of the overall distribution 
of individual characteristics in the population at large, as in equations (2.6) and (2.7). Pecking 
order theory here differs from Thurow (1975)’s job competition model where wages are only 
“based on the characteristics of the job in question” (op. cit p. 76) and “not directly on ... personal 
characteristics” (ibid, p. 77). In Thurow’s model, marginal productivity is taken as a fixed 
characteristic of the job, but wages do not necessarily equal marginal productivity, with Hartog 
and Oosterbeek (1988) concluding that in Thurow’s model “in fact, it is not at all clear how 
exactly earnings are determined”. 
 
In pecking order theory, wages are those which induce those workers highest in the pecking order 
of desirable characteristics into the jobs whose specifications will ensure that these individual 
characteristics result in the highest value of output across the range of available jobs. While the 
parameters of the distributions of job specifications and individual characteristics both enter into   6
the wage equation (2.7), they remain constant across the same labour market at any given point in 
time.  The parameters of the distributions of job specifications and individual characteristics   
therefore do not appear explicitly as variables in the associated cross-section wage equation  for a 
given labour market. However, they remain of considerable potential importance in examining the 
impact on wages of changes in these underlying parameters over time.  
 
Pecking order theory also has an important role to play in the analysis of the incidence of 
overeducation and undereducation across different individuals. In analysing the incidence of 
overeducation and undereducation of graduates with different levels of degree qualifications, we 
will assume that jobs can be categorised into one of five levels. Level 4 = A corresponds to those 
requiring PhD-level skills,  3 = A to those requiring Masters-level skills,  2 = A  to those requiring 
undergraduate degree-level skills,  1 = A to those requiring college-level skills, and  0 = A to those 
requiring none of these skills. Higher level jobs at time t will be assumed to involve higher levels 
of specification according to the index Jjt. 
o
t J
A   will denote the minimum level of the job 
specifications index Jjt for which skills of levelA>0 are required, and below which only a lower 
level of skills is required.  
 
Since from (2.4), (2.5) and (2.7) for any job j for which individual i is selected: 
 
                     
22 2 (/) ( / ) / ( /) 0 it jt ijt it jt it it dC dJ V C J w C =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ >                                                       (2.8) 
 
a pecking-order process will apply to the selection of individuals according to their overall quality 
given by the linear function: 
   
                                qit   = ln Cit   = xit a   +   it ε                                                                                                                       (2.9) 
 
where xit ≡ (xi1t,....,xin-1t ) ≡ (lnXi1t,....,lnXin-1t ), a ≡ (a1,...,an-1),  it ε  ≡   ln uit.. Individuals with a 
higher quality according to their qit rating in the pecking order of individuals in the population will 
attain a higher value to their Cit  index of individual characteristics that enhance their 
employability, and hence secure a higher specification job according to the index Jjt  in (2.8).  In 
particular, in order to secure a job of level  0 > A  or above, individual i must have a quality level  
 
                           (/) ( l n )
oo
it t Ct Jt t Jt Ct qq J σ σθ θ >≡ −+
AA                                                              (2.10) 
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Employers thus set a ‘hurdle’ level 
o
t q
A at time t for the minimum quality qit of individual i to 
whom an offer is made of a level  0 > A job. This hurdle level, moreover, depends upon the 
parameters of the distribution of job specifications in the economy and the distribution of 
individual characteristics in the population, both of which may change over time with growth in 
the economy at large and changes in the supply of graduates.  
 
We will assume that ln µit , and hence  it ε , is a stochastic variable that is normally distributed with 
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one across the population, independently of xit. The 
probability of any individual i with objective characteristics given by xit being offered employment 
at time t at  level  0 > A or above is then given by: 
 
                          ( ) Pr( ) Pr( )
oo
t it it t it it it t px q qx x a q ε ≡> = + >
AA
A  
                                                                                                                                                     (2.11) 
                       1 Pr( ) 1 ( ) ( )
oo o
it it t it t it t x aq Nx aq N x aq ε = − ≤ − += − − += −
AA A  
 
where N is the cumulative standardised normal distribution function. Using (2.11), we can estimate 
the coefficient vector a and the intercept term 
o
t q
A using an ordered probit analysis, as in Table 5 
below. 
 
From (2.5), (2.6) and (2.9), the total supply of individuals who satisfy a minimum level of quality 
of  t q  is given by: 
 
                      ( ) (1 (( )/ )) / 0 t t t t Ct Ct t t S q N q with S q η θσ =− − ∂ ∂ <                                               (2.12) 
 
From (2.5), the total demand, 
o
t D
A , by employers at time t for individuals to fill jobs of 
level 0 > A or above is given by: 
 
                         (1 ( ))
o
tt t t DJ ηϕ =−
A
A                                                                                             (2.13) 
 
The minimum quality hurdle 
o
t q
A that employers set at each time t for making a job offer of level A 
in (2.10) is set to equate the supply,  ()
o
tt Sq
A , of individuals with at least the quality level 
o
t q
A to the 
demand, t DA , by employers for individuals to fill jobs of level  0 > A or above. 
 





Figure 1: The minimum quality hurdles and the demand for graduates 
 
 
                               
In Figure 1, the minimum quality hurdle 
o
t q
A for an individual to be offered a job at level 0 > A   is 
thus determined as that value of  t q  where  ()
o
tt Sq
A  is equal to the demand t DA , with a higher level 
of such demand from employers implying a lower quality hurdle  
o
t q
A in order for the available 
supply of individuals to be sufficient to meet the demand . Such equality implies also that: 
 
     
1 4
1, 4 4 4 () ( ) f o r 1 , 2 , 3 a n d ()
oo o
tt t t t t t t tt t t t SS q S q DD D SS q DD
+
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i.e. an equality between the number of individuals, t S′′ A , who are available within each quality range 
and the number of jobs,  t D′′ A , employers are seeking to fill at each level of employment.  
 
Overeducation can arise in the above pecking order analysis from the possibility that an individual 
will have graduated with a qualification of level  0 > A (which we will denote by  1 it δ = A )  but still 
have an overall level of quality  it q  that falls short of the minimum hurdle level, 
o
t q
A , for being 
offered a job of level A. The associated probability of overeducation is given by: 
 
              ( ) Pr( & 1) Pr( ) ( )
oo o o
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where  it x
A  is a vector of individual characteristics  it x that includes the individual having graduated 
with a qualification of level  0 > A . Similarly undereducation can arise in the above pecking order 
analysis if an individual has an overall level of quality,  it q , that exceeds the minimum hurdle level, 
o
t q
A, for being offered a job of level A, even though they have not graduated with a qualification of 
level  0 > A (which we will denote by  0 it δ = A ).  The associated probability of undereducation is 
given by: 
 
              ( ) Pr( & 0) Pr( ) ( )
uo o o o o o
t it it t it it it it t it t px q qx x a q N x aq δε ≡> = = + > = −
AA A A A A





A  is a vector of individual characteristics  it x that includes the individual having graduated 
without a qualification of level  . A   
 
 
3. The Empirical Determinants of the Incidence of Overeducation and 
Undereducation 
 
In this section, we analyse the empirical determinants of over- and undereducation across 
individuals, against the background of the above theoretical analysis. Our empirical analysis is 
based upon data from a survey that was carried out amongst 18722 graduating students, from 45 
universities and colleges in seven provinces spread geographically across China, including 5 
higher education institutions in Beijing, 6 in Shangdong, 6 in Guangdong, 6 in Hunan, 4 in 
Shannxi, 17 in Yunnan and 1 in Guangxi, under the supervision of the Research Centre for the 
Economics of Education at Peking University. Within the sample, 39.3 per cent of graduating 
students had graduated with college diploma qualifications, 57.1 per cent with bachelor degrees, 
3.0 per cent with Masters degrees and 0.6 per cent with Doctorates. At the time that the survey 
took place, in June 2003, 40.7 per cent of respondents had found a job, 4.0 per cent individuals 
planned to be self-employed, 15.1 per cent planned to continue studying, 20.0 per cent had other 
plans and 20.2 per cent had not yet found a job. Since those who had found a job by the time that 
they were graduating may not have exactly the same characteristics to the population of graduates 
at large, we will correct for such selection bias in our analysis.  
 
There are three main ways in which overeducation has been measured in the literature to date. The 
first depends on a systematic external evaluation by an expert job analyst who defines the 
education requirements of a particular type of job by reference to a standard manual, such as U.S.   10
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (e.g. Rumberger, 1987) or the ARBI code developed by the 
Dutch Department of Social Affairs (see Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988). While this approach seeks 
to be objective, occupational titles may span different detailed job requirements that can change 
with technology and economic growth. A second external method is the statistical method 
developed by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) who define overeducation as existing if an individual 
has an education level more than one standard deviation above the mean education level for their 
occupation. However, the mean educational level of those in the occupation will itself depend 
upon the supply of graduates over time, so that the benchmark for defining overeducation in a 
particular job is itself endogenous to this process. The third approach, which we deploy here, and 
which has been widely used elsewhere is that of self-assessment. This method can take account of 
heterogeneity of individuals and skills needed for each job at the time of the self-assessment. In the 
survey questionnaire used in our study, students who had found a job were asked: “What is your 
current qualification?” (with four possible choices from college diploma to university doctorate) 
and “What is the minimum formal qualification required in your contracted job?” (with six 
possible choices from a junior school education to a PhD). Matching the two groups of answers 
resulted in the distribution for implied rates of over- and undereducation shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: The incidence of over- and undereducation across educational levels and subjects 
Education Level / 
Subject 
























Diploma  41.1  12.9  52.7  47.3  41.4  13.5  40.8  12.3 
Bachelor  12.4  21.1  65.4  34.6  13.3  21.9  10.7  19.7 
Master 7.3  35.8  59.1  41.0  6.4  36.9    8.5  34.1 
PhD 0.0  42.0  73.9  26.1  0.0  41.1    0.0  44.4 
Total  17.4  20.5  62.8  37.2  17.2  21.5  17.7  18.8 
Economics  18.9  22.2  56.4  43.6  18.3  20.6  19.7  24.3 
Law  22.0  19.6  49.8  49.8  11.0  6.6  6.2  8.2 
Art  18.6  17.1  40.9  59.0  16.9  22.0  19.8  13.7 
Medicine  17.2  17.2  44.8  55.1  17.0  12.3  17.4  21.2 
Science 12.2  18.3  59.1  41.0  14.4  21.7    9.0  13.4 
Engineering  16.8  18.5  78.0  22.1  16.8  19.1  16.7  16.7 
Agriculture 8.3  28.1  73.0  26.9  10.0  30.0    3.7  23.0 
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Table 3 shows that overall 20.5 per cent of graduates across China who had jobs reported 
themselves as being overeducated. This is a higher than the 12 per cent rate of overeducation found 
by Bauer (2002) in Germany and the 17 per cent rate found in Holland by Hartog and Oosterbeek 
(1988) and by Alba-Ramirez (1993) in Spain. However, it is considerably lower than the 42 per 
cent rate found in the UK by Battu et al (1999), the 30-38 percentage rate found in another study in 
the UK by Dolton and Vignoles (2000), the 30 per cent rate found in Canada by Frenette (2004), 
and the rates of 42 per cent and 41 per cent in the US found by Duncan and Hoffman (1981) and 
Sicherman (1991) respectively, with all of these studies using the self-reporting method. The 
percentage in China, however, varies in Table 3 from 12.9 per cent in the case of college graduates 
to 42.0 per cent in the case of PhDs, with overeducation more frequent among those studying for 
higher degrees than among those studying for lower degrees. This is consistent with the findings of 
Groot (1996) in the UK, although differs from those of Frenette (2004) in Canada, where graduates 
with Master’s degrees were the most likely to be overeducated, followed by college graduates.  
 
The overall rate of overeducation for females in Table 3 in China is 18.8 per cent, rather less than 
the overall 21.5 percentage rate for males. The overall rates of undereducation in China for females 
and males were similar at 17.7 per cent and 17.2 per cent respectively. In comparison, Groot 
(1996) in the UK, and Duncan and Hoffman (1981) in the US, found the overall rates of both 
overeducation and undereducation to be less for females than males.  Our findings across fields of 
study differ from those in developed countries, where there tends to be a high variation in 
overeducation rates across fields of study (see Frenette 2004). In China, the overeducated rate is 
similar across major subjects, with the exception of Agriculture, which has the highest 
overeducation rate and the lowest undereducation rate. Outside of Agriculture, Economics 
graduates have the highest overeducation rate and Law graduates the highest undereducation rate. 
The overall rate of undereducation was 17.4 per cent, and monotonically increased from 0.0 per 
cent for PhDs up to 41.1 per cent for college Diploma graduates, with a similar trend for both 
males and females. 
 
The survey also recorded information on each individual’s personal characters, academic 
achievement and choice of geographical location and employment sector, that allows us to 
examine the factors which are statistically related to over-education and under-education. These 
variables are shown in Table 4 below. 
 









Base case is a 2-year college degree 
Schooling  Total years spent in higher education in excess of 2 years for a college 
Diploma 
Bachelor  Two additional years spent completing a Bachelor’s degree compared to the 
base case of 2 years for a college Diploma. 
Masters  Three additional years spent completing a Master’s degree in addition to a 
Bachelor’s degree. 
PhD  Three additional years spent completing a PhD degree in addition to a 
Master’s degree 
Cadre  Position of responsibility held in university (1 = not a student 
representative, 2 =  student representative at class level, 3 = student 
representative at Departmental or Institute level, 4 = student representative 
at University level) 
Parentalcareer  1 = Father is a manager, officer or government official, 2 = Father is a 
professional technician or clerk, 3 = Father is a manual worker, retailer or a 




Parental Qualification (1 = Father's highest qualification is a Master’s 
degree or above, 2 = Father's highest qualification is a Bachelor’s degree, 3 
= Father's highest qualification is as a college graduate, 4 = Father's highest 
qualification is as a senior school graduate, 5 = Father's highest 
qualification is as a junior school graduate, 6 = Father’s highest 
qualification is below junior school level) 
Registration 
1 = Registered as born in a large city, 2 = Registered as born in a small city, 
3 = Registered as born in a small town, 4 = Registered as born in a village 
Partymember  1 = Is a member of the Chinese Communist Party 
 
English 
1 = Has no English Language qualification, 2 = Has acquired the College 
English Test Level 4 qualification, 3 = Has acquired the College English 




1 = Degree is in the top quartile of marks, 2 = Degree is in the second 
quartile of marks from the top, 3 = Degree is in the third quartile of marks 
from the top, 4 = Degree is in the lowest quartile of marks. 
workplace  1= The job chosen is in a village, 2 = The job chosen is in a small town, 3 = 
The job chosen is in a small city, 4 = The job chosen is in a large city. 
stateown  1 = The job chosen is in a State-Owned Enterprise 
govern  1 = The job chosen is in a Government or related bureau 
jointven  1 = The job chosen is in a Joint Venture Company 
institute   1 = The job chosen is in an educational institute 
workprovince 
The rank from 1 to 31 of the province within China in which the job chosen 
is located in decreasing order of its GDP per capita, as an indicator of its 




Level 1  The threshold score  to secure a  college-graduate level job.  
Level 2  The threshold score  to secure a  Bachelor’s-level job. 
Level 3  The threshold score  to secure a  Master’s-level job. 
Level 4  The threshold score to secure a  PhD-level job. 
 
 
In line with our pecking-order analysis, the determinants of the rates of overeducation and 
undereducation were estimated by an ordered probit model conditioning on these individual 
characteristics. As our sample is selected from graduates who had already signed their employment 
contract, who may systematically differ in their individual characteristics to the wider population 
of graduates, the Heckman (1979) two-step method was used to adjust for sample selection. In the 
first step, a probit model was used to estimate the parameters of the selection equation for those 
graduates who had been successful in obtaining an employment contract by the time that they were 
graduating. These parameter estimates were then used to obtain the inverse Mills ratio (Davidson 
and McKinnon, 2004) that was used to correct for selection bias in the second step, where an 
ordered probit model was used to analyse the determinants of the overeducation and 
undereducation rates amongst those who did have employment contracts on graduation. Three sets 
of coefficients for these determinants are reported in Table 5 below, namely those for males, 
females, and both combined. In Table 5, * denotes that the relevant coefficient is significant at the 
90 percent level, ** that it is significant at 95 per cent level, and *** that it is significant at the 99 
per cent level.   14
 
In the first version of the ordered probit model, labelled Ordered Probit Model I, in Table 5, the 
Schooling variable was used to estimate the length of higher education, with the base case of a 
two-year college degree as the minimum for students within our sample of graduates. The 
coefficient on this variable proved to be highly significant for both genders combined and for 
males and females separately. In the second version of the ordered probit model, labelled Ordered 
Probit Model II, the Schooling variable was replaced by three separate variables. These were 
firstly the Bachelor variable for all those that had completed at least a Bachelor level degree, and 
which corresponds to two more years study in higher education than the base case of 2 years for a 
college Diploma. Secondly, the Masters variable for all those who had completed at least a 
Master’s degree corresponds to three more years’ study compared to achieving a Bachelor’s 
degree. Thirdly, the PhD variable, for all those graduating students who had completed a PhD 
degree corresponds to three more years’ study compared to achieving a Master’s degree. The 
coefficients in the pecking-order model on each of the three variables Bachelor, Masters and PhD 
proved to be highly significant for both genders combined, and for males and females separately.   
 
Model I is a nested case of Model II, with the additional restriction of the same coefficient on each 
year of higher education in the Schooling variable, compared to different possible coefficients on 
each year spent in Bachelor’s, Master’s and PhD study in Model II. A Likelihood Ratio (LR) test 
for whether Model II is a significant improvement upon Model I yielded a chi-squared statistic of 
9.86 for the case of both genders combined, which with two degrees of freedom is  significant at 
the 1 per cent level. Similarly for males, the LR test, involving twice the difference between the 
unrestricted maximum of the loglikelihood function and its restricted maximum, yields a chi-
squared statistic of 11.78, which with two degrees of freedom is also significant at the 1 per cent 
level.  However, for females, the corresponding chi-squared statistic of 2.74 is not significant, 
implying that there is no strong evidence of a differential effect of additional years higher 
education at different degree levels for females in China. 
 
The inverse Mills ratio proved to be very significantly positive for females in both Models I and II, 
but otherwise not significant. This suggests sample selection was not significant except for 
females. As Vella (1998, p. 129) notes: “The possibility of sample selection arises whenever one 
examines a subsample and the unobservable factors determining inclusion in the subsample are 
correlated with the unobservables influencing the variable of primary interest”. The significant 
positive coefficients for the inverse Mills ratio in the case of females suggests that the   15
unobservables in determining whether the student has any job offer on graduation, such as being 
more proactive in searching for a job before graduation, are indeed positively correlated (see 
Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004, pp. 486-9) with the unobservable individual characteristics in the 
ordered probit model, such as enthusiasm and a positive personality, which increase the student’s 
chances of securing a higher level job within the sample of students who do have a job offer on 
graduation. 
 
A variable which is indeed significantly positive across both males and females, and for both 
genders combined, in the Ordered Probit Models I and II is membership of the Chinese 
Communist Party. The Cadre variable, that reflects having a position of responsibility within the 
student body, is also significantly positive, except for males in Model I. Since both these attributes 
involve a process of selection according to how well regarded the student’s ability and character 
are amongst their peers or superiors, they are likely to reflect personal characteristics which are 
considered important within China. In contrast, degree classification was not significant in Models 
I and II, except for females. The lack of a significant effect of degree classification parallels the 
conclusion of Battu et al (1999), who found that degree class played no part in explaining 
overeducation in UK. In contrast to the conclusion of Dolton and Silles (2001) that students 
graduating with first class honours in the UK are more likely to find a job requiring a degree, there 
was no evidence in our analysis of data from across China that a superior degree classification was 
a positive factor influencing employers’ job offers to graduates within China. This may be reflect 
the fact that degree programmes in China still contain compulsory courses in Marxism, Chinese 
History and other subjects which count towards the final degree classification, but which 
employers do not value highly.   
 
The subject of the degree (with History as the base case) was similarly insignificant for both 
genders separately and combined. This contrasts with the findings of Groot (1996), Battu et al 
(1997), Dolton and Stilles (2001), and Frenette (2004), that being a graduate in Arts or Languages 
in the US, UK or Canada increases the chances of failing to find a graduate-level job. In contrast to 
the findings of Dolton and Vignoles (2002) that there is a significant wage premium on 
mathematical ability in the UK, being a graduate in Science (a category which includes 
Mathematics in Table 5 below) or Engineering in China does not have a significantly positive 
effect on the chances of securing a graduate-level job. In contrast to the UK, where students may 
give up studying Mathematics at the age of 16 (or even 14), Mathematics is a compulsory subject   16
for students in China in the entrance examination to higher education at the age of 18, which they 
must pass at a high level to gain a university place, so that proficiency in Mathematics carries less 
of a scarcity value in China than in the UK. 
 
Table 5: Determinants of the Attractiveness of Graduates for Securing Graduate-Level Jobs 
 
Ordered Probit Model I  Ordered Probit Model II  Variable 
Combined Male Female  Combined Male  Female 
Female  0.029 
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Agriculture -0.011 -0.083  0.057  -0.057  -0.172 0.099   17







































































































































































































Loglikelihood -4962.174 -3315.348 -1590.688 -4957.245  -3309.458  -1589.320 
Observations  5018  3217 1801 5018 3217  1801 
 
 
However, for males and for both genders combined, English language ability was a very 
significantly positive factor in securing a higher level job amongst graduates in China. Willingness 
to work in a larger city rather than a small town or village, in a State-owned enterprise, in a 
government or related bureau, in a joint venture company or in an educational institute, rather than 
elsewhere, was similarly a very significant positive factor in securing a higher level job for both 
genders separately and combined in Models I and II. For males, willingness to work in a province 
with a higher degree of economic development, according to the province’s comparative ranking 
of its GDP per capita, increased the chances of securing a higher level job. However, the converse 
was true for females, with an insignificant overall coefficient on this variable for both genders 
combined, in Models I and II. Father’s career was only significant in the case of females in Model 
I. Father’s qualifications and the residential background of the student were insignificant in all 
cases.   18
 
In both Models I and II, we are able to test whether or not all the other coefficients which affect 
the probability of an offer of a better job are equal across males and females. Since the 
Combined case can be treated as a restricted version of the unrestricted case where these 
coefficients are free to vary between males and females, we can deploy a Likelihood Ratio test 
on the null hypothesis that these coefficients are all equal. When we compute twice the 
difference between the unrestricted maximum of the loglikelihood function and its restricted 
maximum, in Model I we obtain a value of 112.28, and in Model II a value of 116.94. Using the 
corresponding asymptotic chi-squared distributions with 29 and 31 degrees of freedom 
respectively, these values are highly significantly different from zero. The null hypothesis that 
the above coefficients are all equal can be rejected for both Models I and II. Significantly 
different weights on the relevant variables thus appear to be applied in job offers between male 
and female graduates in China.  
 
The significant positive weight placed upon English language abilities suggests that students who 
have studied abroad in an English-speaking country will, other things being equal, have an 
advantage over students studying within China who have not developed such abilities. Other 
advantages that students studying outside China may acquire, and which may help them to avoid 
the average 20.5 per cent risk within China of failing to find a job matching their graduate 
qualifications, are more links and contacts within Western countries, including in some cases 
access to jobs outside China. 
 
 
4. The Determinants of A Job Offer Before Graduation 
 
Since only 40.7 per cent of the respondents surveyed had a job offer before graduation, we 
examine in this section the determinants of having any such job offer before graduation. As 
discussed above, this involves an initial probit analysis that generates the inverse Mills ratio in the 
above second step ordered probit analysis. The coefficients in the initial probit analyses for the 
variables which affect the probability of having a job offer on graduation are shown in Table 6 
below. In order to aid the identifiability of the ordered probit model in the second step of the 
analysis (see Vella, 1998, p. 135), additional variables are included in the initial probit analysis for 
the probability of having a job offer in the first step. These include Univ.location and 
born.location, which correspond to the rank from 1 to 31 of the GDP per capita within China of the 
province in which, respectively, the current University of the student, and their birthplace, are   19
located. They also include English2, which corresponds to the square of the English variable in 
Table 4 above, and which adds to the degree of non-linearity involved that can further aid 
identifiability (ibid, p. 135).  
 
Table 6: Probit analysis for the probability of having any job offer before graduation 
 
Probit Model I  Probit Model II  Variable 
combined male  female  combined male  female 
Female  -0.193
*** 
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Loglikelihood  -6327.327 -3744.945 -2553.834 -6245.202 -3703.263  -2517.232 
Observations 11508 6767  4741 11508 6767  4741 
 
 
The findings in Table 6 are consistent with the probability of having a job on graduation being the 
result of conflicting pressures to secure a job before graduation if the individual can find a job 
which meets the individual student’s expectations, without engaging in excessive search time that 
may detract from the student’s remaining university work. If this condition does not hold, the 
student may decide not to accept a job before graduation that does not meet their longer-term 
expectation, but instead decide to search harder after graduation when they have more time 
available to search for a job which does meet their longer-term expectation. The significant 
negative coefficients on being female in Table 6 suggest that females have more difficulty in China 
in securing a job before graduation that meets their longer-term expectation. The  negative 
coefficients on English2 but positive coefficients on the English variable suggest that there may 
indeed be a non-linear inverted U-shaped relationship between English ability (which we confirm 
below is an important determinant of the level of the job which the student can expect) and the 
probability of their having a job offer before graduation. Students whose English scores are 
currently low may decide not to take a lower-level job before graduation, but instead devote their 
time to improving their academic performance before graduation and more time to searching for a 
better job after graduation. Those students whose current English scores are reasonably good are 
more able to secure a good job offer before graduation, and more likely to accept it. Those students 
whose English abilities are high may be more confident of being able to secure a very good offer 
after graduation and are less willing to spend time searching for a job offer before graduation. 
 
The significant positive coefficients on the educational qualification variables and on party 
membership in Table 6, alongside their positive role in boosting the level of job the individual is   21
likely to be offered in Table 5 above, indicate that these variables raise the chances of the 
individual securing a good job that meets their longer-term expectations before graduation. Since 
the Univ.location variable involves the ranking of the province in which the University is located 
according to its GDP per capita from the top of the associated distribution within China, the 
significant negative coefficients on Univ.location in Table A indicate that a higher GDP per capita 
for the province of the University tends to boost their chances of receiving an acceptable job offer. 
Conversely, the significantly positive coefficients on born.location are consistent with higher 
expectations for those students who originate from more affluent provinces, and a lower 
willingness to accept a job offer before graduation that does not meet their higher expectation.  
 
The significant negative coefficients on the Cadre variable in Table 6 suggest that individuals with 
greater responsibilities within the University may be less willing to spend time searching for a job 
before graduation, but alongside the results of Table 5 above are confident that their current 
responsibilities will boost their chances of securing a higher level job. The significant negative 
coefficients on the degree classification variable that indicates the quartile from the top in which 
the individual’s marks fall is consistent with a greater willingness of students with good marks to 
look for a job before graduation. There are also several significant coefficients on degree subject in 
Table 6, in contrast to their absence in Table 5 above. Majoring in Engineering, Medicine and 
management can significantly increase the chances of a job offer before graduation, whereas 
majoring in Law tends to reduce it. 
 
 
5.  Overeducation and Socially Optimal Investment in Education  
 
A central question for educational policy in China is the extent to which the emerging problem of 
graduate overeducation in China casts doubt upon the economic desirability of China’s policy of 
rapid expansion of higher education, and instead suggests that its supply of graduates now exceeds 
a socially optimal level. The possibility of graduate supply exceeding a socially optimal level can 
itself arise from the economic logic of the pecking order model.  Individuals making decisions on 
their desired length of schooling,  i H , may seek to maximise their life-time utility  i U  (using a 
subjective time preference rate i ρ ), subject to an inter-temporal budget constraint that the present 
value of their life-time consumption is equal to the present value of their wage income less the 
present value of their tuition fees, i.e. 
   22
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where  it c is individual i’s consumption level at time t,  i L  is their life-span, r is the prevailing 
interest rate,  it ψ is the level of their tuition fees at time t, and  i R  is their retirement age. Wage 
income  it w earned during the individual’s working life after leaving full-time education at time 
i tH = up until retirement at time  i tR = must here provide a return on the individual’s investment in 
education that is sufficient to finance their life-time consumption. This includes their consumption 
in retirement that is funded through their savings and pension contributions out of their wage 
income whilst working.  In view of recent policy concerns over the need to adjust retirement ages 
to improve the funding of pension schemes (e.g. Pensions Commission, 2006), we will consider a 
number of possibilities for the extent to which the retirement age  i R  is responsive to  i H , through 
the relationship:            
 
                         1 0 0 ii i i R T H where and R H κ κ =+ ≥≥ − >                                                    (5.2) 
 
The case  0 κ =  corresponds to the case where there is a fixed retirement age T  irrespective of how 
long the individual has spent in full-time education. The case  1 κ =  in contrast corresponds to the 
case where the individual works T  years to finance their retirement, irrespective of how long they 
have spent in full-time education. 
 
For analytical simplicity, we will assume in this section that the wages  it w of each individual 
during their working life are influenced by their length of schooling,  i H , by their length of 
working experience  i tH − at time t, and by n - 2 other individual characteristics that do not change 
over time, with:  
 
                              12 exp( ) it i it i i X H and X t H for t H == − ≥                                              (5.3) 
 
in the wage function (2.7). Over time, the index  t v  of  macroeconomic variables is assumed grow 
at the rate  v g ,  whilst the mean level  Jt θ of the log of the job specifications index  jt J  across the 
available jobs j in the economy is assumed to increase by  J g  per unit of time. The expansion rate 
in education is characterised here by the parameter 1 g , that corresponds to the increase per unit 
time in the mean level of ln i H across individuals. While the mean levels of these variables are   23
increasing over time, for the sake of simplicity we will assume that the variances of ln jt J and 
ln it C remain constant, with: 
 
                              , , / 0 Jt J Ct C J C for all t σ σσ σσσσ == ≡ ≥                                                (5.4) 
 
Equations (2.7), (5.3) and (5.4) then imply: 
 
                               exp( ( ))
i it iH w i i ww g t H f o r t H =− ≥                                                            (5.5) 
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so that whilst the growth rate  w g  in wages over time is boosted by the growth rate  v g  in the 
macroeconomic index  t v , by the growth rate  J g  in job specifications and by the coefficient  2 a  on 
the gain from working experience, it is depressed by a higher rate of supply of more educated 
individuals, to an extent that depends upon the parameter σ  that reflects the relative dispersion of 
job specifications and individual characteristics in the economy.  
 
When (5.5) is inserted into (5.1), the first-order conditions for (5.1) may readily be shown to imply 
that individual i’s desired length of education is given by: 
 
                         
*
12 /[ ((1 )( )/(1 )(1 ))] ii i w i Ha a P r g P ξ κσ =+ + −−− +                                         (5.7) 
 
                           where  /
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Differentiation of (5.7) in turn implies that: 
 
                     
** **
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so that individual i’s desired length of education is an increasing function of its coefficient  1 a in the 
production function (2.1), the growth rate  w g  in wages, the coefficient σ of relative dispersion in 
job specifications and individual characteristics, and of κ , reflecting the extent to which their 
working life is not reduced by additional years of education. At the same time, individual i’s 
desired length of education is a decreasing function of the coefficient  2 a  in the production function 
on years of working experience, rather than additional education, of the overall rate of expansion 
1 g  of education in the population at large, and of the ratio  i ξ  between the tuition fees which   24
individual i pays for additional education and the wage they forego in undertaking such additional 
full-time education. A variation in  i ξ  across individuals will itself produce variations in the desired 
length of education across different individuals. Ceteris paribus, high ability individuals who face 
low tuition fees, net of scholarships, compared to their foregone wage will have a higher desired 
length of education compared to those of lower ability individuals, whose opportunity costs of 
wages foregone are low compared to the wages of their teachers and their associated tuition fees.  
 
Each individual’s desired length of education can then be compared to the length of education 
**
i H which maximises the value  ij V of their production over their working life, net of the full cost 
() ii H χ of their education. Using equations (2.1), (5.2) and (5.3), when the coefficients 
2 ,, a n d vJ gg a are held constant, the first order conditions for the associated optimisation: 
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can be shown to imply: 
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An advantage of assuming a finite life-span  i L  and finite retirement age  i R , in contrast to an 
infinite life-span with no retirement, is that we do not need to impose here the restriction that 
or w rg rg >> in (5.7) - (5.12), so long as  1 ii P κ ξ < + . 
 
For the case  1 0a nd
o
ii g ξ χ =≤ , (5.6) - (5.8), (5.12) - (5.13) imply: 
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ii HH >                                                                                                   (5.14) 
 
so that under the above assumptions individuals’ desired levels of education exceed  those that 
maximise the value of their own production, net of the full costs of their tuition. More individuals 
may then willingly undertake higher education than can be justified on the basis of the net value of 
their own resultant increased production, and in this sense are willingly overeducated. 
 
Such an incentive for willing overeducation arises here because each individual has an incentive in 
the pecking order model to seek to improve their own personal characteristics relative to those of   25
other individuals, and thereby inflict a negative externality upon the relative position of the other 
individuals with whom they are competing for graduate-level jobs. This is true even though greater 
education does contribute directly to increased production in the production function (2.1). The 
pecking order model differs in several respects from signalling theory (e.g. Spence, 1973), where 
individuals have an incentive to invest, and over-invest, in education when their educational level 
is used as a signal to convey information to their potential employers about their future 
productivity, even though the education may not itself directly raise their productivity. As Spence 
(1973) noted, ‘Systematic overinvestment in education is a distinct possibility because of the 
element of arbitrariness in the equilibrium configuration of the market’, with education potentially 
an arbitrary choice as the signal for higher productivity within signalling theory. However, within 
our above pecking order model, increased education does raise each individual’s output, but with a 
limited number of graduate-level jobs available in the economy at any given time.   
 
Moreover, within our pecking order model, the incentive for each individual to seek to be 
overeducated is potentially reduced by the expansion of higher education, as reflected in the 
coefficient  1 g . With a positive increase of  1 g each period in the mean value of the log of the length 
of education in the population, the scarcity value of more education declines and the associated 
rate of growth of wages is reduced in equation (5.6), if we hold constant the coefficients 
2 ,, a n d vJ gg a . The incentive for each individual to seek to be overeducated is thereby reduced in 
equation (5.7), with 
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whenever 1 0 and hence w gg g >> in equation (5.6), so that the inequality (5.14) no longer 
necessarily holding once  1 0 g > in equations (5.7) and (5.12). In particular, a growth rate of higher 
education that is persistently higher than the growth rate of GDP may substantially depress the 
anticipated growth rate of graduate wages in (5.6), so that any tendency for individuals to seek to 
be overeducated from (5.7) is significantly reduced.  
 
Further important considerations arise when we relax our earlier assumption that the growth rates 
and , vJ gg   and the coefficient  2 a ,  are constant over time. In order to examine the impact of 
possible changes in these growth rates, we may first note that the mean value of production per   26
capita in the economy at each time t under the pecking order model is given from equations (2.1) – 
(2.6) by: 
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using Aitchison and Brown (1963 , pp.8, 12) and (5.4). It can be seen from (5.16) that  t V depends 
in general on the covariance  JC σ  within the economy between the index of job specifications for 
each job and the index of characteristics of the individuals who fill those jobs. The pecking order 
model secures the maximum mean value of production per capita by ensuring that the jobs with 
the highest specifications, according to the index J, go to the individuals with the highest ratings 
according to the index of individual characteristics C, so that there is a correlation coefficient of 
one in (2.5), (2.6) and (5.16) between J and C across the economy. From (5.16), we have the 
present value of the mean value of production per capita to be given by: 
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using equations (2.1) – (2.4) and (5.3), where we now require  G rg >  in this infinite horizon social 
objective function. Maximisation of V using (2.1) and (5.4) implies a socially optimal level of 
education to maximise the present value of production per capita that is given by: 
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when we take account of the impact of additional years  i H   of education not only on the 
individual’s own production and of their full tuition costs, but also upon the growth rate g . From 
(5.13), we have 
 
                        2 / (/) (/) (/) iv i J i i gH g H g H a H ∂∂= ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂                                                 (5.20) 
 
Increased education, not least at the graduate level, may then succeed firstly in raising the rate of 
growth of the macroeconomic variables within the index v. This includes the rate of technological 
progress in a process of endogenous growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995), such as through a 
more rapid rate of diffusion of technology from more advanced economies, which more advanced 
learning and contact with international bodies of knowledge may help to facilitate. The importance   27
of a higher level of education in increasing the speed of adoption of best-practice technology has 
been emphasised by Nelson and Phelps (1966). Acemoglu et al (2006) underline the role of human 
capital in boosting economic growth both in the adoption of existing frontier technology, and in 
the innovation of new technology, where the availability of highly-skilled human capital is even 
more important.   
 
In the case of China, there may be great scope for the deployment of graduate-level skills not only 
in the improved design and manufacture of existing products, and their production at lower 
environmental cost than has been involved in China’s recent rapid economic growth, but also in 
the innovation of more sophisticated products and services based upon more advanced technology. 
This in turn may increase the rate of growth of the value of China’s exports, domestic consumer 
expenditure and other components of its GDP. Thus, whilst in the past non-graduate production 
and supervisory jobs in low-cost manufacturing have helped to generate a substantial trade surplus 
for China, achieving greater value added in the face of international competition may in the future 
require more graduate-level skills in design, engineering and management. The deployment of 
more graduate level skills in the investment of China’s large and growing stock of foreign 
exchange reserves (that are currently valued in excess of US$1,682 billion) may further boost the 
rate of growth of its foreign exchange earnings. While these have in the past been invested mainly 
in fixed interest securities, China is now turning its attention to more active equity investment in 
overseas enterprises, with a consequent need for more graduate-level investment and management 
skills.  
 
The above process may be reinforced by a form of Say’s Law, in which an increased supply of 
graduates tends to create its own demand, through a steady raising of the job specifications (as 
reflected in the index J) of those jobs into which graduates are recruited, so that they more fully 
utilise the additional education which they have received. This process may start in response to an 
excess supply of graduates by a raising of the nominal job requirements to include a degree, for 
many jobs and professions where non-graduate had previously been recruited in large numbers. 
However, over time, technological progress and an increased sophistication of China’s products 
and services may facilitate, and themselves be facilitated by, an upgrading of the actual skills 
which graduates exercise in the jobs to which they have been recruited. Overeducation therefore 
needs to be viewed in this context as a dynamic phenomenon, with the analysis including the 
interaction between both supply- and demand-side variables.  
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The above processes will also be reinforced if there exists complementarity between the 
productivity of individual graduates, as well as complementarity between the productivity of 
individual graduates and the capital and technology which they deploy. Individual graduates may 
be better able to deploy their enhanced skills in transactions and collaborations with other 
graduates, so that there is an externality at work in the impact of an increased length of education 
for an individual on overall social productivity and economic growth (see Easterly, 2001). If an 
increase in the growth rate,  1 g , of the length of education does succeed in boosting the economic 
growth rate, g , this will itself reinforce the growth rate,  w g , of wages in equations (5.6) and 
(5.13), and thereby to some extent offset the negative partial effect which an increased supply of 
more highly educated individuals has on graduate wages and on individuals’ desired length of 
education in (5.7).  
 
In addition to boosting the growth rate g through increases in both  and vJ gg , increased education 
may boost the rate,  2 a , of learning-by-doing in equations (2.1) and (5.3) and (5.13), by which 
work experience after an individual’s years of formal education helps to boost the value of output. 
Graduate education may facilitate enhanced learning and problem-solving abilities that will enable 
graduate to progress faster and translate experience into more valuable production at a higher rate 
per unit time. 
All of these influences may increase the marginal impact of additional years’ education upon the 
growth rate g in (5.20), thereby boosting the value of  i G in (5.19) and the socially optimal length of 
education 
***
i H in (5.18). Any excess of the individual’s desired length of education 
*
i H over the 
socially optimal length of education will then be smaller than otherwise, with overeducation in 
terms of an excess of
*
i H over 
***
i H not in general implied. However, the extent and direction of this 
divergence will depend upon the strength of the marginal impacts of years of additional education 
upon  2 ,a n d vJ gg a  in equations (5.18) – (5.20). That economic growth may be first an increasing, 
but then a decreasing, function of the percentage of high-skilled individuals in the population is 
discussed in Rehme (2007). If a failure of graduates at the margin to find jobs that utilise their 
additional education were to be associated with a permanent state of under-employment of their 
graduate abilities, then doubts may arise as to the numerical strength of the marginal impacts in 
(5.20), and hence of the degree to which such individuals’ desired lengths of education
*
i H are 
aligned with the socially optimal length of education 
***
i H . These doubts may be reinforced by   29
mixed empirical evidence on the link between additional educational investment and economic 
growth (see e.g. Mankiw et al (1992), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Pritchett (2001), Krueger and 
Lindahl (2001), and de la Fuente and Donenech (2006)). In addition, the achievement of sustained 
economic growth may depend upon the joint fulfilment of many other conditions than educational 
expansion (see Easterly, 2001).   
Nevertheless, China starts from a relatively low percentage of its population in possession of 
tertiary education, with only 8.4 per cent of its 25 – 64 year old population having attained tertiary 
education in 2005, compared to 30 per cent for the United Kingdom and 38 per cent for the United 
States (OECD, 2007), though with the percentage for China increasing rapidly to 10.2 per cent by 
2006. There may still therefore be great scope for even transitionary gains to China from the 
diffusion of advanced knowledge and technology from more advanced economies, that the 
expansion of higher education in China can help to achieve. The importance of the composition of 
the human capital stock in disentangling the impact of higher education on economic growth has 
been emphasised by Aghion et al (2006), who found some empirical support from US data for 
their model in which more advanced education maximises productivity growth for those states 
which are close to the current technological frontier, whilst less advanced education maximises 
productivity growth for those states that are far from this frontier. As China seeks to move closer 
to the international frontiers of technological progress, a substantial input of graduate-level skills 
may in particular be required if it seeks to develop its own output-mix beyond the mass production 
of low technology products into those based upon more advanced electronics, engineering, science 
and design. Our own empirical findings have underlined the importance of the characteristics of 
human capital in a number of directions, including differential rates of importance placed by 
employers in China on years of education according to the level at which it occurs, as well as rates 
of reported overeducation that increase substantially with the degree level involved. At the same 
time, we have found overall a 17.4 percentage rate of self-reported undereducation amongst 
graduating students across China. As in Table 3 above, this is concentrated particularly amongst 
students graduating with only a two-year College Diploma, where the rate of undereducation rises 
to 41.1 per cent, suggesting considerable scope for beneficial additional education within this part 
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6. Conclusion  
 
While the overall percentage rate of overeducation in China of 20.5 per cent is higher than that 
found in several European countries, it is still lower than that found in several studies in the US 
and UK.  Whether this represents an over-investment in graduate education by the individuals 
concerned, and by China as a whole, will depend very much upon how this investment in higher 
education interacts with the future rate of economic growth of China as an emergent economy. 
 
The expansion of China’s economy, and the effectiveness with which it deploys its rapidly 
expanding graduate population, clearly has major implications for other economies with which 
China is competing for world markets. Particularly once it moves beyond the mass production of 
low cost, low technology products, China may have greater scope than many of its competitors for 
combining increased technological knowledge with low cost labour supplies in the production of 
more sophisticated products and services. The pressure of increased international competition and 
globalisation in these product markets may in turn make the returns to investment in higher 
education in the US and other advanced economies more interdependent with the development of 
China’s own graduate market, and on the extent to which China does succeed in deploying its 
rapidly expanding production of graduates in productive graduate-level employment.  Such 
increased interdependence will reinforce the linkage which already exists in the higher education 
systems of the UK and US, via their large-scale recruitment of students from China, with the job 
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